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The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt
Arvind Krishnamurthy
Northwestern University and National Bureau of Economic Research
Annette Vissing-Jorgensen
Northwestern University, National Bureau of Economic Research, and Centre for Economic Policy
Research
Investors value the liquidity and safety of US Treasuries. We document
this by showing that changes in Treasury supply have large effects on
a variety of yield spreads. As a result, Treasury yields are reduced by
73 basis points, on average, from 1926 to 2008. Both the liquidity and
safety attributes of Treasuries are driving this phenomenon. We doc-
ument this by analyzing the spread between assets with different li-
quidity (but similar safety) and those with different safety (but similar
liquidity). The low yield on Treasuries due to their extreme safety and
liquidity suggests that Treasuries in important respects are similar to
money.
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Fig. 1.—Corporate bond spread and government debt. The figure plots the Aaa-Treasury
corporate bond spread (y axis) against the debt-to-GDP ratio (x axis) on the basis of annual
observations from 1919 to 2008. The corporate bond spread is the difference between
the percentage yield on Moody’s Aaa long-maturity bond index and the percentage yield
on long-maturity Treasury bonds.
I. Introduction
Money, such as currency or checking accounts, offers a low rate of return
relative to other assets. The reasons behind this phenomenon are well
understood. Money is a medium of exchange for buying goods and
services, has high liquidity, and has extremely high safety in the sense
of offering absolute security of nominal repayment. Investors value these
attributes of money and drive down the yield on money relative to other
assets.
We argue that a similar phenomenon affects the prices of Treasury
bonds. The high liquidity and safety of Treasuries drive down the yield
on Treasuries relative to assets that do not to the same extent share
these attributes. Figure 1 provides evidence for this assertion. The figure
graphs the yield spread between Aaa-rated corporate bonds and Treasury
securities against the US government debt-to-GDP ratio (i.e., the ratio
of the market value of publicly held US government debt to US GDP).
The figure reflects a Treasury demand function, akin to a money de-
mand function. When the supply of Treasuries is low, the value that
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investors assign to the liquidity and safety attributes offered by Treasuries
(referred to below as the Treasury convenience yield) is high. As a result,
the yield on Treasuries is low relative to the yield on the Aaa corporate
bonds, which offer less liquidity and safety. The opposite applies when
the supply of Treasuries is high. We present detailed econometric evi-
dence of the relation reflected in figure 1 using several alternative yield
spread measures and controlling for corporate bond default risk.
We further show that it is the liquidity and safety attributes of Trea-
suries that drive investors’ high valuation of Treasuries. We examine the
yield spread between a pair of assets that are different only in terms of
their liquidity, as well as the yield spread between a pair of assets that
are different only in terms of their safety. Under the hypothesis that
liquidity and safety are priced attributes, the yield spread between these
pairs of assets should reflect the equilibrium price of liquidity/safety.
We show that changes in Treasury supply affect each of these yield
spreads. The results indicate that Treasuries offer liquidity and safety
so that changes in the supply of Treasuries separately change the equi-
librium prices of liquidity and safety.
We compute that the value investors have paid on average over our
main sample for 1926–2008 for the liquidity and safety attributes of
Treasuries is 73 basis points per year, of which at most 46 basis points
are for liquidity and at least 27 basis points for safety. Our findings imply
that the government collects seigniorage from the liquidity and safety
attributes of Treasuries, and we compute that the government has saved
interest costs of about 0.25 percent of GDP per year because of investors’
demand for Treasuries. This figure is comparable in magnitude to the
traditional notion of seigniorage, which stems from the public’s will-
ingness to hold fiat money at zero interest. We compute that the latter
seigniorage is also around 0.25 percent of GDP per year. Our results
also indicate that Treasury interest rates are not an appropriate bench-
mark for “riskless” rates. Cost of capital computations using the capital
asset pricing model should use a higher riskless rate than the Treasury
rate; a company with a beta of zero cannot raise funds at the Treasury
rate. In addition, the equity premium measured relative to Treasury
rates will partly be driven by the liquidity and safety of Treasuries.
Relation to literature.—Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) use default
risk as estimated from the price of credit default swaps to measure the
component of the spread between corporate and Treasury yields that
is due to default considerations. They find a large unexplained non-
default component. This finding is in keeping with many papers in the
corporate bond pricing literature. Compared to the prior literature, the
novelty of our work is to offer more direct evidence of the existence of
a nondefault component by documenting that the amount of Treasuries
outstanding is a key driver of the nondefault component of the cor-
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porate bond spread. Furthermore, our paper shows that the nondefault
component is driven by the liquidity and safety attributes of Treasury
bonds.
We are aware of only a few papers in the literature that have noted
a relation between the supply of government debt and interest rate
spreads. Cortes (2003) documents a relation between Treasury supply
and swap spreads over the period 1994–2003. Longstaff (2004) docu-
ments a relation between the supply of Treasury debt and the spread
between Refcorp bonds and Treasury bonds over the period 1991–2001.
Relative to these papers, we study a much longer sample, provide a
theoretical basis to study the relation, use several approaches to rule
out that the relation could be driven by time-varying default risk, and
decompose the Treasury convenience yield into a liquidity and safety
component.
There is also a literature that seeks to examine whether the relative
supplies of long- and short-term Treasury debt have an effect on the
term structure of Treasury yields. Early work in this literature was mo-
tivated by the 1962–64 “operation twist,” in which the government tried
to flatten the term structure by shortening the average maturity of gov-
ernment debt (see, e.g., Modigliani and Sutch 1966). More recently,
Reinhart and Sack (2000) show that the projected government deficit
is positively related to the slope of the Treasury yield curve, suggesting
that this is evidence of a supply effect. More systematic evidence of a
relative supply effect is provided by Greenwood and Vayanos (2010),
who examine data for 1952–2005 and show that the relative supply of
long and short Treasuries is related to the slope of the yield curve.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) study the Federal Reserve
quantitative easing policies in 2008–11 whereby the supply of long-term
Treasuries was reduced. Using an event study methodology, they show
that long-term Treasury yields fell relative to short-term yields and at-
tribute this to demand for extremely safe assets of specific maturities.
These papers suggest that supply effects affect the relative yields of long
and short Treasuries and are complementary to our study.
In macroeconomics, there is a large literature exploring the Ricardian
equivalence proposition (Barro 1974), that the financing choices of the
government used to fund a given stream of government expenditures
are irrelevant for equilibrium quantities and prices. One implication of
the Ricardian equivalence proposition is that the size of government
debt has no causal effect on interest rates. Despite a large amount of
research devoted to studying this topic, there is yet no clear consensus
on the effects of debt on interest rates (see, e.g., the survey by Elmendorf
and Mankiw [1999]). We identify an effect on the spread between gov-
ernment interest rates and corporate interest rates. It is possible that
Ricardian equivalence fails in a way in which government debt has an
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effect on the general level of interest rates, both corporate and govern-
ment. Since we focus on spreads, we are unable to isolate such an effect.
From an empirical standpoint, the advantage of focusing on spreads
rather than on the level of interest rates is that the spread measure is
unaffected by other shocks (such as changes in expected inflation) that
affect the level of interest rates and complicate inference. We also bypass
endogeneity issues stemming from government behavior since it is un-
likely that the government chooses debt levels on the basis of the cor-
porate bond spread.
This paper is laid out as follows. Section II lays out a theoretical
framework to relate the demand for the attributes offered by Treasuries
to the price of Treasuries relative to other assets. The section develops
a series of predictions of the theory. We test each of the theoretical
predictions in Section III. The paper also includes appendices providing
details on the data construction and the mathematical derivations.
II. Theoretical Framework
We articulate our theory by modifying a standard representative agent
asset-pricing model to include a term whereby agents derive utility di-
rectly from holdings of a “convenience” asset. The modification is along
the lines of Sidrauski (1967), which considers a model in which agents
derive utility from their holdings of money. The representative agent
maximizes

tE bu(C ). (1) t
tp1
Suppose that is the sum of an endowment of plus “convenience”C ct t
benefits:
AC p c  n(v , GDP; y). (2)t t t t t
The benefits are a function of the real holdings of convenience assets,
. One example that we elaborate on below is that the functionAv n(7)t
captures the notion that holding more Treasury securities reduces costs
that would otherwise be incurred by transacting in a less liquid security
such as corporate bonds.1 The argument is the market value of theAvt
agent’s real holdings of convenience assets, which include both Trea-
suries, , and any other private-sector assets, , that provide servicesT Pv vt t
similar to Treasuries:
1 To be more precise, we can define , where the functionAC p c  cost(v , GDP ; y )t t t t t
reflects costs that will be incurred by holding less liquid securities. When morecost(7)
Treasuries are held, these costs are reduced. This is just a renormalization relative to our
defining a benefit function that is increasing in . The important aspect of theAn(7) vt
modeling is that .AdC /dv 1 0t t
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A T P Pv p v  k v . (3)t t t
The constant measures the convenience services provided by thePk
private-sector assets relative to Treasuries. The term in the convenienceyt
function is a preference shock that affects how much utility is derived
from convenience assets. An example of such a shock is a “flight to
quality” as during a financial crisis, where investors may temporarily
increase their valuation of convenience assets such as Treasuries. The
income of the agent is , which is measured in real terms.GDPt
We assume that the convenience function is homogeneous of degree
one in and . This captures the idea that liquidity benefits doubleAGDP vt t
if both income and convenience assets double. Thus define
Avt Av ; y GDP { n(v , GDP; y). (4)t t t t t( )GDPt
We assume that the convenience function is increasing in , butAv /GDPt t
the marginal convenience benefit is decreasing in and has theAv /GDPt t
property . That is, holding more conve-′ Alim v (v /GDP; y) p 0Av /GDPr t t tt t
nience assets reduces the marginal value of an extra unit of convenience
assets. Furthermore, this marginal value approaches zero if the agent
is holding a large amount of convenience assets.
Let us next consider what underlies our reduced-form convenience
function . We argue that Treasuries are valued for their liquidity andv(7)
safety. Papers such as Vayanos and Vila (1999) and Rocheteau (2009)
show how the superior liquidity of an asset will lead investors to pay a
higher price for that asset. Under these theories, an increase in the
holding of liquid assets will lower the marginal liquidity service provided
by any liquid asset. That is, our earlier assumption that the marginal
convenience, , is decreasing in is a natural outcome of these′ Av (7) v /GDPt t
models. We refer to these theories as describing a liquidity attribute.
A second benefit of Treasuries is that they are widely believed to
provide absolute certainty of nominal repayment. Under some theories,
this safety attribute can drive a convenience yield that is declining in
the supply of safe assets.
Consider short-term Treasuries, such as 3- or 6-month maturity bills,
which carry negligible price risk. Suppose that some investors face costs
of understanding investment in risky assets, as in the literature on limited
participation of investors in the stock market (Vissing-Jorgensen 2003).
These investors will have a unique demand for riskless assets, driving
up the price of riskless assets. In addition, in many limited participation
models, expanding the stock of riskless assets reduces risk premia and
raises riskless rates (see Gomes and Michaelides 2008). Another expla-
nation for safety demand stems from the use of Treasuries as collateral
in many financial transactions. Gorton (2010) notes that there is a sub-
stantial demand for collateral for purposes of mitigating counterparty
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risk in derivatives and settlement systems. The collateral in these trans-
actions is required to be extremely safe, thus also driving the demand
for a safety attribute. Bansal and Coleman (1996) argue that commercial
banks and money market funds use Treasuries to back checkable de-
posits. Treasuries thus inherit some of the medium of exchange con-
venience of money, lowering the yield on Treasuries. In this explanation,
it is again the safety of Treasuries that makes them good backing for
checking accounts. We will offer empirical evidence that the safety at-
tribute of Treasuries is one of the drivers of the convenience yield.
However, we will not distinguish further whether the underlying driver
of safety demand is due to limited participation, collateral, or the check-
backing explanations.
The safety explanation for low Treasury yields is distinct from that
suggested by any of the standard representative agent model explana-
tions of high risk premia in asset markets. This literature has demon-
strated how altering the preferences of a representative agent to feature
high risk aversion can produce low riskless interest rates and high risk
premia. Thus, in the representative agent model there will be a negative
relation between the price of a bond and its default risk. However, the
quantity of convenience assets is unrelated to asset prices in the rep-
resentative agent model. A way to think about how safety demand works
is that the relation between price and default risk is very steep near zero
default risk, over and above the negative relation implied by the rep-
resentative agent model. Furthermore, the slope of this curve near zero
default risk decreases in Treasury supply. This latter prediction generates
a negative relation between the corporate Treasury bond spread and
Treasury supply (at a given level of corporate bond default risk) and is
how to distinguish the safety explanation from a standard risk-based
explanation (fig. 1 in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen [2011] il-
lustrates this relation).
The safety attribute may also apply to long-term Treasuries, such as
30-year bonds, which carry significant price risk because of interest rate
volatility. Here, the limited participation, collateral usage, or check-back-
ing explanations are unlikely to be relevant. Instead, Greenwood and
Vayanos (2010) suggest that investors such as defined-benefit pension
funds have a special demand for certain long-term payoffs to back long-
term nominal obligations. The same motive may apply to insurance
companies that write long-term policies. Furthermore, Chalmers (1998)
describes how long-term Treasury bonds are posted as collateral by mu-
nicipalities to secure their own long-term borrowings. Broadly, this ex-
planation is similar to the preferred habitat hypothesis of the term
structure of interest rates (Modigliani and Sutch 1966), under which
investors are hypothesized to prefer certain maturities of bonds, but
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applied only (or to a larger extent) to extremely safe bonds. We refer
to these theories as describing a long-term safety attribute.
We can represent these different theoretical rationales for conve-
nience in our specification of . Denote as the stock of long-T,longv(7) vt
term Treasury bonds and as the stock of short-term TreasuriesT,shortvt
( ). Also define as the stock of non-Treasury liquidT T,long T,short P,liqv p v  v vt t t t
assets, as the stock of non-Treasury short-term safe assets, andP,short-safevt
as the stock of non-Treasury long-term safe assets. Suppose thatP,long-safevt
total convenience on short-term Treasuries can be written as the sum
of two convenience components:
T liq P,liqv  k vt t liqv (7) p v ; yT,short liq t( )GDPt (5)
T,short short-safe P,short-safev  k vt t short-safe v ; y .short-safe t( )GDPt
Similarly, we can specify the convenience on long-term Treasuries as
T liq P,liqv  k vt t liqv (7) p v ; yT,long liq t( )GDPt (6)
T,long long-safe P,long-safev  k vt t long-safe v ; y .long-safe t( )GDPt
The constants, , , and , measure the convenience thatliq short-safe long-safek k k
the private-sector assets offer relative to Treasuries.
Our specification emphasizes that the safety attributes may differ
across short- and long-term assets and thus lead to a difference in con-
venience value in long-term assets relative to short-term assets. In con-
trast, our specification assumes that both long- and short-term Treasuries
offer equal liquidity services. The empirical literature has documented
the existence of significant liquidity premia on both long-term and short-
term Treasuries (Amihud and Mendelson 1991; Krishnamurthy 2002;
Longstaff 2004). Consistent with the results from Longstaff, who studies
liquidity premia on both long-term and short-term (3 months and
longer) Treasuries, we make the assumption that long- and short-term
Treasuries are equally liquid.
A. Spreads and Supply
We derive pricing expressions for short- and long-term bonds based on
these different specifications of convenience. As we describe below, de-
composing the convenience in the manner above also yields empirical
tests of the existence of priced safety and liquidity attributes. Before
describing these tests, let us turn to asset pricing. We initially derive
predictions of the convenience yield theory that do not distinguish be-
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tween the liquidity and safety motives. We then turn to predictions
implied by each of these separate motives. In terms of the framework
above, our initial set of predictions implicitly assume that both vT,long
and are functions only of (as opposed to functions of both totalTv vT,short t
Treasury supply and short- or long-term Treasury supply). This will be
the case if long and short Treasury supply moves in parallel (and if the
demand shocks are perfectly correlated) or if only a liquidity motive is
present. We relax this assumption later.
Denote the price level at date t as . If the agent buys a zero-couponQ t
nominal Treasury bond for a nominal price , his real holdings riseT AP vt t
by .2 The first-order condition for Treasury bond holdings is thenTP /Qt t
T T TP P Pt t1 t′ ′ ′ A ′ u (C ) bE u (C )  v (v /GDP, y)u (C ) p 0. (7)t t t1 t t t t[ ]Q Q Qt t1 t
Define the pricing kernel for nominal payoffs as
′u (C ) Qt1 tM p b (8)t1 ′u (C ) Qt t1
so that
T T T ′ AP p E [M P ] P v (v /GDP; y) ⇒t t t1 t1 t t t t (9)
TE [M P ]t t1 t1TP p .t ′ A1 v (v /GDP; y)t t t
This expression indicates that a positive marginal value of convenience,
, raises the price of Treasuries, .′ Tv (7) Pt
Let us next derive pricing expressions for a zero-coupon corporate
bond that offers no convenience services. Suppose that the corporate
bond may default next period with probability and in default paysl t
, where measures the amount of losses suffered in default1 L Lt1 t1
(and is a random variable). If the bond does not default, it is worth
. Then, since the bond offers no convenience, its price satisfiesCPt1
CP p l E [M (1 L )FDefault]t t t t1 t1 (10)
C (1 l )E [M P FNo Default].t t t1 t1
In our empirical work we estimate the convenience demand by′v (7)
relating to two different measures of the price difference betweenTvt
and , short-maturity yield spreads between corporate and TreasuryC TP Pt t
bonds and long-maturity yield spreads. We now derive expressions for
each of these price measures and compare them. For simplicity, we focus
our derivations on continuously compounded yields.
2 We derive pricing expressions for zero-coupon Treasury and corporate bonds. In our
empirical work, we examine coupon bonds and assume that the impact of Treasury supply
on coupon bond spreads is qualitatively similar.
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Consider first the case of one-period bonds. For such bonds, CP pt1
. ThenTP p 1t1
TE [M P ]T ′ At t1 t1i T v (v /GDP ;y )t t t te p P p ≈ e E [M ]. (11)t t t1′ A1 v (v /GDP; y)t t t
For the corporate bond, define as a random variable that is equal˜Lt1
to zero if there is no default and equal to if there is default. ThenLt1
Ci C ˜ ˜te p P p E [M ] E [M ]E [L ]Cov [M , L ]t t t1 t t1 t t1 t t1 t1
˜l E [L ]Cov [M , L ]/E [M ]t t t1 t t1 t1 t t1≈ e E [M ].t t1
We thus have the following prediction.
Prediction 1 (Impact of Treasury supply on short-term spreads). The
one-period yield spread between corporate and Treasury bonds is related
to the stock of Treasuries as follows:
T P Pv  k vt tC T ′S { i  i p v ; y  l E [L ]t,1 t t t t t t1( )GDPt (12)
˜ Cov [M , L ]/E [M ].t t1 t1 t t1
The yield spread reflects the sum of three terms: the convenience yield
on Treasuries, the expected default on the corporate bond, and a risk
premium associated with the covariance between default and the pricing
kernel. Assuming that , is declining in . Con-′′ T P Pv (7) ! 0 S (v  k v )/GDPt,1 t t t
sider next the relationship between and . ProjectT PS v /GDP v/GDPt,1 t t t t
linearly on , so that , whereT P Tv /GDP v/GDP p a  a v /GDP  errort t t t 0 1 t t t
the is uncorrelated with . ThenTerror v /GDPt t t
T P P P P T P(v  k v )/GDP p k a  (1 k a )v /GDP  k error .t t t 0 1 t t t
If , then is declining in . The latter condition willP T1 k a 1 0 S v /GDP1 t,1 t t
be satisfied if , that is, unless the private sector reduces itsPa 1 1/k1
supply of substitutes by more (in effective terms, ) than theP Pk v/GDPt t
increase in the Treasury supply. 
We verify the prediction of the convenience model that an increase
in causes the yield spread to fall. Our regressions of the yieldTv /GDPt t
spread on recover ratherT ′ P P Tv /GDP v (7){1 k [(v/GDP)/(v /GDP)]}t t t t t t
than because of the private-sector reaction to changes in Treasury′v (7)
supply. In order to recover , we further need knowledge of and′ Pv (7) k
. We do not explore that in this paper because forP T(v/GDP)/(v /GDP)t t t t
most questions of interest, it is more important to know ′v (7){1
rather than .P P T ′k [(v/GDP)/(v /GDP)]} v (7)t t t t
Note that it is possible that Treasury supply reacts accommodating to
demand shocks ( ) or to increases in corporate default risk. This willyt
bias the relation between spreads and Treasury supply toward finding
a positive relation, the opposite of the causal negative relation from
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Treasury supply to spreads. However, we view it as unlikely that overall
Treasury supply reacts substantially to demand shocks or changes in the
risk of corporate bonds. The more plausible reaction involves the pri-
vate-sector supply or the government’s supply of particular maturities.
Let us next consider multiperiod bonds. Define the t-period yields
on corporate and Treasury bonds as
1 1T T C Ci p  ln P and i p  ln P . (13)t,t t t,t t
t t
The spread between these bonds is .C TS p i  it,t t,t t,t
Consider again the derivation for corporate bonds. Our derivation
for multiperiod bonds closely follows Duffie and Singleton (1999), re-
flecting the standard practice in the corporate bond pricing literature.
Suppose that the event of default or no default is nonsystematic (i.e.,
uncorrelated with ). Then, we can drop the conditioning on de-Mt1
fault/no default and rewrite (10) as
C CP p E [M (l (1 L ) (1 l )P )]. (14)t t t1 t t1 t t1
Assume that we can write the expected present value of the payment
in default as
CE [M (1 L )] p E [M P ](1 D ) (15)t t1 t1 t t1 t1 t
for a suitable process .3 This is Duffie and Singleton’s “recovery ofDt
market value” assumption. Then
C C l D Ct tP p [l (1 D ) (1 l )]E [M P ] ≈ e E [M P ]. (16)t t t t t t1 t1 t t1 t1
Note that the term is a function of and , which embodyCP D lt1 t1 t1
changes in future default expectations such as downgrades. For high-
grade corporate bonds, which are the focus of our study, almost all of
the default-related risk is of this form rather than in terms of the bonds
defaulting between t and . In our setup, the latter default-relatedt 1
risk may be correlated with and carry a risk premium. Thus, ourMt1
restriction that the default event in the next period is nonsystematic is
not a substantively important restriction but does help to simplify our
pricing expressions.
Prediction 2 (Impact of Treasury supply on long-term spreads). The
yield spread between t-period corporate and Treasury bonds is related
to the stock of Treasuries as follows:
3 Note that in expression (15), the left-hand-side expectation is conditioning on default,
whereas the right-hand-side expectation is conditioning on no default. However, given
the assumption that the default event is nonsystematic, we can drop the conditioning.
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tt1 tt11 1′ AS p E [v (v /GDP; y)] E [l D ] t,t t j j j t j j
t tjpt jpt (17)
tt1 1
 Cov (m , R ), t j1 j1
tjpt
where ( ) is the log pric-′ ′m p logM p log b[u (C )/u (C )](Q /Q )j1 j1 j1 j j j1
ing kernel, and is the one-period excess return of corporate bondsRj1
over Treasury bonds. Assuming that , is declining in′′ Tv (7) ! 0 S (v t,t t
. As long as increases with , increases in Trea-P P A Tk v )/GDP v /GDP v /GDPt t j t j t
sury supply lower the spread, . St,t
The derivation of this spread expression is in Appendix A. The der-
ivation assumes that all relevant variables, including and changes inmt
the corporate and Treasury bond yields, are normally distributed.
The spread reflects three terms: (1) the expected average Treasury
convenience benefit over the next t periods, (2) the expected average
amount of default, and (3) a risk premium that depends on the co-
variance between the pricing kernel and the excess return on corporate
over Treasury bonds.
Let us compare the short-term and long-term spread expressions.
Note that shocks to both and have an impact on the short-Av /GDP yt t t
term spread. The impact of these shocks on the long-term spread de-
pends on the persistence of the shocks. In the data, a flight to quality
(liquidity and safety) shock ( ) is likely to be short lived and shouldyt
primarily affect short-term spreads. The debt-to-GDP ratio is quite per-
sistent so that shocks to will have a significant impact on bothAv /GDPt t
short- and long-term spreads. This logic tells us that the convenience
yield as embodied in the long-term spread is primarily driven by
, whereas variability in the short-term spread will partly be drivenAv /GDPt t
by .4 This is an advantage of using the long-term spread and data onyt
to estimate convenience yields. On the other hand, the cor-Av /GDPt t
porate bonds we use to construct the short-term spread are closer to
4 Here is a simple case to formalize these points. Suppose that the convenience yield
function is
′ A Av (v /GDP ; y ) p b  b log (v /GDP ) logy .t t t 0 1 t t t
Here, we have written the demand shock, , to enter additively in the convenience yieldyt
and assumed a log convenience yield function, as we do in most of our empirical tests.
The short-term spread equally reflects a supply term and a demand termAb log (v /GDP )1 t t
. Suppose that is AR(1) with coefficient r and that is independentAlogy log (v /GDP ) logyt t t t
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with mean zero. Then it is easy to verify that the con-
venience yield component of the long-term spread is
tt1 1 1 logyt′ A A 2 t1…E [v (v /GDP ; y )] p b  b log (v /GDP )(1 r r   r )  . t j j j 0 1 t t
t t tjpt
If we take years (the maturity for the long spread in our study) andt p 20 r p 0.95
(consistent with data on the debt-to-GDP ratio), then the supply coefficient (1 r
is 0.64 and the demand coefficient is 0.05.2 t1…r   r )(1/t) 1/t
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default free. The corporate bonds used in the long-term spread carry
greater default risk. Thus, the results based on the long-term spread
are more sensitive to precise controls for default risk.
B. Liquidity and Safety Attributes
We now reintroduce the different liquidity and safety attributes of Trea-
suries and consider how one can test if these attributes are priced.
Following equations (5) and (6), long- and short-term assets should be
expected to have different convenience yields. To be precise, let us
reconsider the short- and long-term spread expression. The short-term
spread reflects liquidity and short-term safety:
T liq P,liqv  k vt t′ liqS p v ; yt,1 liq t( )GDPt
T,short short-safe P,short-safev  k vt t′ short-safe v ; y (18)short-safe t( )GDPt
˜ l E [L ]Cov [M , L ]/E [M ].t t t1 t t1 t1 t t1
The long-term spread (the spread for large t) reflects the expected
liquidity and long-term safety attributes over the term of the bond:
tt1 T liq P,liq1 v  k vj j′ P,liqS p E v ; yt,t t liq j( )[t GDPjpt j
T,long long-safe P,long-safev  k vj j′ longsafe v ; y (19)long-safe j( )]GDPj
tt1 tt11 1
 E [l D ] Cov (m , R ). t j j t j1 j1
t tjpt jpt
We consider pairs of assets that have either similar liquidity and dif-
ferent safety or similar safety and different liquidity. The yield spread
between these assets reflects only the price of liquidity or the price of
safety. We can then test whether the price of the attribute captured by
the yield spread changes with the relevant supply of Treasuries.
Consider first the spread between P2- and P1-rated commercial paper.
The former has a higher default risk than the latter. The assets are short-
term but similarly illiquid as we document in the next section. Thus the
P2-P1 spread purely reflects the value of short-term safety convenience.
Prediction 3 (Impact of Treasury supply on the price of short-term
safety). Consider that P2- and P1-rated commercial paper are equally
liquid (i.e., ) but that . Then, the spread be-liq liq short-safe short-safek p k k 1 kP2 P1 P1 P2
tween these bond yields is related to the stock of short-term Treasuries
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as follows:
P2-P1 short-safe short-safeS p (k  k )t,1 P1 P2
T,short short-safe P,short-safev  k vt t′ short-safe# v ; yshort-safe t( )GDPt (20)
 l E [L ] l E [L ]t,P2 t t1,P2 t,P1 t t1,P1
˜ ˜ Cov [M , L  L ]/E [M ].t t1 t1,P2 t1,P1 t t1
If short-term safety is a priced attribute and Treasuries have this attribute,
then increases in the supply of short-term Treasuries will lower P2-P1St,1
(as long as increases in ). T,short short-safe P,short-safe T,short[v  k v ]/GDP v /GDPt t t t t
In terms of the estimation, the P2-P1 spread is directly a function of
the supply of short-term convenience assets. There is extensive evidence
that both the private sector and the Treasury actively manage the ma-
turity structure of debt. To get around any endogeneity issues stemming
from this behavior, we use instrumental variables (IV) regressions, using
as an instrument for (a similar comment appliesT T,shortv /GDP v /GDPt t t t
for testing prediction 4 below).
Next consider a similar prediction but based on the spread between
two long-term corporate bonds.
Prediction 4 (Impact of Treasury supply on the price of long-term
safety). Take two long-term corporate bonds, an Aaa-rated bond and
a Baa-rated bond. Consider that these bonds are equally liquid (i.e.,
but that . Then, the spread between theseliq liq long-safe long-safek p k ) k 1 kAaa Baa Aaa Baa
bond yields is related to the stock of long-term Treasuries as follows:
Baa-Aaa long-safe long-safeS p (k  k )t,t Aaa Baa
tt1 T,long long-safe P,long-safe1 v  k vj j′ long-safe# E v ; y t long-safe j( )[ ]t GDPjpt j (21)
tt1
Baa Baa Aaa Aaa E [l D  l D ] t j j j j
jpt
tt1 1 Baa-Aaa Cov (m , R ). t j1 j1
tjpt
If long-term safety is a priced attribute and Treasuries have this attribute,
then increases in the supply of long-term Treasuries will lower Baa-AaaSt,t
(as long as increases in ). T,long long-safe P,long-safe T,long[v  k v ]/GDP v /GDPt t t t t
A similar comparison, but now getting at the liquidity attribute, is
made through the following prediction.
Prediction 5 (Impact of Treasury supply on the price of liquid-
ity). Consider a one-period Treasury bond that offers one unit of li-
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quidity and is default free. Consider also a Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) insured bank deposit that is default free but offers
only units of liquidity. Then, the one-period spread between theseliqk ! 1
bonds is related to the stock of Treasuries as follows:
T liq P,liqv  k vt tFDIC FDIC T liq ′ liqS p i  i p (1 k )v ; y . (22)t,1 t t liq t( )GDPt
If liquidity is a priced attribute and Treasuries have this attribute, then
increases in the supply of Treasuries will lower (as long asFDIC TS [v t,1 t
increases in ). liq P,liq Tk v ]/GDP v /GDPt t t t
III. Evidence
Details on the data construction for each table as well as the sources
for all variables used in our regressions are in Appendix B. The re-
gressions all use data at an annual frequency and for as long a period
as is feasible given the variables included in the regression.
A. Impact of Treasury Supply on Spreads
Predictions 1 and 2 state that under the convenience yield hypothesis,
increases in Treasury supply should reduce short spreads and long
spreads. Table 1 presents regressions confirming these predictions.
The key explanatory variable in the regressions reported in the tables
is the log of debt/GDP, where debt/GDP is the market value of the
outstanding stock of US Treasuries divided by US GDP. The measure
of government debt corresponds to what is referred to as publicly held
debt. It includes debt held by the Federal Reserve but excludes debt
held by other parts of the government such as the Social Security Trust
Fund. Our results do not change appreciably if we exclude the holdings
of the Federal Reserve. The debt measure is as of the end of the gov-
ernment’s fiscal year, that is, the end of June up to and including 1976
and the end of September from 1977 on. Statistics on government debt
are typically reported in face value terms, whereas we are interested in
the market value of debt.5 Appendix B details how we adjust face values
to come up with the market value of debt.
The theoretical measure of convenience yield (convenience benefit)
is , where includes both Treasury debt and private-sector′ A Av (v /GDP) vt t t
convenience assets. Predictions 1 and 2 are that the convenience yield
is declining in . As we have noted, as long as private-sectorAv /GDPt t
convenience asset supplies do not change more than one for one (in
5 Doepke and Schneider (2006) encounter the same issue in studying how inflation
affects the market value of debt. They offer a procedure to compute market values of
debt.
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the opposite direction) in response to changes in Treasury debt, we can
verify predictions 1 and 2 by examining the impact of changes in Trea-
sury debt on price measures. The regression coefficient on Treasury
debt should be interpreted as reflecting the effect, net of the private-
sector supply response, of a change in Treasury debt on the Treasury
convenience yield.
1. Long-Term Spreads
In table 1, the Treasury debt variable is the logarithm of the debt-to-
GDP ratio, and the dependent variable in each regression is a bond
yield spread measured in percentage terms. Panels A and B present
results for long-term spreads, namely, the spread between long-term Aaa-
rated corporate bonds and long-term Treasuries (panel A) and the
spread between long-term Baa-rated corporate bonds and long-term
Treasuries (panel B). We use the log functional form because it provides
a good fit and requires estimation of only one parameter. A drawback
with the log function is that it does not asymptote to zero as debt-to-
GDP rises. We estimate an alternative functional form with the asymptote
property in Section III.C.
The regressions in table 1 are estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS). We report t-statistics adjusting the standard errors assuming an
AR(1) error structure. The AR(1) structure is motivated by a standard
Box-Jenkins analysis of the autocorrelation function and partial auto-
correlation function of the error terms. The first-order autocorrelations
are included in the table. Serial correlation is pronounced only in the
long-term spread regressions of panel A. For consistency across columns,
we use the AR(1) adjustment in all columns though it makes little dif-
ference except in panel A, where t-statistics based on “standard” OLS
standard errors (assuming an i.i.d. error term) would be substantially
larger than those presented. An alternative to OLS estimation with an
AR(1) standard error adjustment would be to use generalized least
squares (GLS) estimation. However, we suspect that log(debt/GDP) is
not a perfect measure of the convenience state variable in the long-
term spread regressions, . It is likely that thett1 ′ A (1/t)E [v (v /GDP; y)]t j j jjpt
private-sector expectations of this sum involve variables other than the
current debt-to-GDP ratio (notably information about the likely devel-
opment of the government budget). If so, then debt-to-GDP is measured
with error implying downward bias in the impact of Treasury supply on
spreads (under standard assumptions about the measurement error).
GLS estimation would be more affected by the measurement error issue.
To see this, suppose that the error autocorrelation was close to one.
Then GLS would effectively transform the data to run a first-difference
regression. While in levels the variance of log(debt/GDP) is likely to
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be large relative to that of the measurement error, in first differences
this will not be the case since the high persistence of log(debt/GDP)
means that the volatility of its first difference is low (a formal Monte
Carlo study of this issue is available on request). These considerations
lead us to present OLS regressions with standard errors adjusted for
the serial correlation. We emphasize that our OLS regression coefficients
are likely to be conservative, understating the impact of Treasury supply
on convenience yields.6
The coefficient of 0.746 in column 1 of table 1 implies that a de-
crease of one standard deviation in debt-to-GDP from its mean value of
0.439 to 0.243 increases the convenience yield component of the Aaa-
Treasury spread by as much as 0.44 percent (44 basis points).
Default risk is an important component of the bond spreads. In col-
umns 2 and 3 we show that the impact of Treasury supply on the Aaa-
Treasury spread is robust to including default controls. Moody’s Inves-
tors Service (2005) estimates, on the basis of data from 1920–2004, that
the default rate on Aaa-rated bonds over a 10-year period is around 1
percent, whereas for Baa bonds this default rate is 8 percent. In column
2, we control for default risk using a default measure computed by
Moody’s Analytics, which is the current industry standard in calculating
default probabilities for corporate bond pricing. Its computation is
based on Merton (1974), which treats the debt of a firm as a riskless
asset minus a put option on the firm’s assets. Using capital structure
information and Merton’s option decomposition of capital structure,
Moody’s infers the firm’s asset value and asset value volatility. This in-
formation allows it to compute the distance to default on debt (i.e.,
moneyness of the put option). Using historical default information in
a nonlinear regression, Moody’s estimates how distance-to-default trans-
lates into default probabilities. We use the median expected default
frequency (EDF) credit measure reported by Moody’s Analytics for large
firms (defined as firms with book value of assets 1 $300 million in
inflation-adjusted dollars). The EDF credit measure is available from
1969 to 2008. The results in column 2 show that the EDF credit measure
is informative. Crucially, the coefficient on log(debt/GDP) remains
highly significant and of roughly the same magnitude as in other spe-
6 A standard solution to the bias problem would be an IV approach. If the error term
was serially uncorrelated, one could use lagged values of log(debt/GDP) as the instrument
for log(debt/GDP). With serially correlated errors one should lag the instrument far
enough to avoid correlation between the instrument and the error term. We find that
the coefficient on log(debt/GDP) is larger in IV estimations and keeps increasing as the
instrument is lagged further. This suggests that the measurement error concern is relevant
but that it is unclear how far to lag the instrument and therefore more conservative to
report only OLS results.
This content downloaded  on Tue, 1 Jan 2013 11:09:48 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
aggregate demand for treasury debt 251
cifications.7 The EDF measure is available only back to 1969, whereas
we would like a default measure that goes back to 1926. Because the
EDF measure is option pricing based, the key input into the measure
is stock return volatility. Thus for the longer sample we use stock return
volatility. We measure the weekly returns on the value-weighted Standard
& Poors index based on daily returns. As the volatility measure for a
given year, we compute the standard deviation of the weekly log returns
over the year leading up to the end of the government fiscal year (the
date of the debt-to-GDP observation). We annualize this standard de-
viation by multiplying by the square root of 52. Over the 40 years for
which we have both EDF data and stock market volatility estimates, the
correlation of these two default measures is .76. This provides strong
support for the use of stock market volatility as a default control over
the full sample. Column 3 presents results using the stock return vol-
atility measure. Volatility is significantly related to the spread, but the
coefficient on log(debt/GDP) is roughly the same as in previous spec-
ifications. Furthermore, the economic effects of changes in the default
risk measures on the Aaa-Treasury spread are modest compared to the
effect of Treasury supply. A one-standard-deviation increase in the EDF
increases the Aaa-Treasury spread by 23 basis points whereas a one-
standard-deviation increase in stock return volatility increases it by 10
basis points.
The regressions in columns 2 and 3 include the slope of the yield
curve as a further control. We measure the slope as the spread between
the 10-year Treasury yield and the 3-month Treasury yield (slope). The
slope of the yield curve is a measure of the state of the business cycle.
It is known to predict the excess returns on stocks and may also pick
up time-varying risk premia on corporate bonds. For example, if inves-
tors are more risk averse in a recession, when the slope is high, they
will demand a higher risk premium to hold corporate bonds. Thus, the
slope of the yield curve serves as a measure of variation in the risk
premium component of the bond spread, that is, the term involving
in prediction 2. We also note that to the extent that corporateCov (7)t
default risk is likely to vary with the business cycle, the slope variable
7 Another issue that arises in interpreting the long-term spread regressions is callability.
Duffee (1998) points out that the Moody’s Aaa index includes callable corporate bonds.
Thus, the Aaa-Treasury spread may also reflect an interest rate option. Duffee proxies for
the moneyness of the call option using the level of interest rates and shows that yield
spreads vary significantly with the level of interest rates. Following this approach, we have
investigated adding levels of short- and long-term Treasury yields as explanatory variables
in our long-term spread regressions and have found that it has no appreciable effects on
the coefficient on log(debt/GDP). A further issue that affects spreads between corporate
bonds and Treasuries is that Treasuries are exempt from state taxes but corporate bonds
typically are not. We have run regressions that include a control for the state tax effect
on the spread (the product of the average state tax rate and the Aaa yield) and find that
our results are largely unchanged.
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can furthermore help control for the expected default in the yield
spread.
For the results for the Baa-Treasury spread in panel B, the coefficient
on log(debt/GDP) in column 5 is considerably higher than the coef-
ficient in column 3 for the Aaa-Treasury spread and implies that a de-
crease of one standard deviation in debt-to-GDP from its mean value of
0.439 to 0.243 increases the convenience yield component of the Baa-
Treasury spread by 0.77 percent (77 basis points). The difference in
results between panels A and B suggests that Aaa bonds offer some
convenience services of Treasuries and thus that the Baa-Treasury spread
is more appropriate for capturing the full effect of Treasury supply on
the Treasury convenience yield. We present further evidence for this
interpretation in table 2 below.
2. Short-Term Spreads
Panels C and D of table 1 are based on short-term bond spreads, with
panel C showing results for the spread between the highest-rated com-
mercial paper (CP) and Treasury bills, both of 3-month maturity, and
panel D focusing on the spread between lower-grade commercial paper
(A2/P2-rated paper) and Treasury bills. The shorter time period is used
in column 9 because yields for lower-grade commercial paper are avail-
able only starting in 1974.8
Short- and long-term spreads may contain different convenience at-
tributes, so we should not expect the coefficients on log(debt/GDP) to
be the same across the different maturities. Nonetheless, the regressions
for short-term spreads show that the effects of changes in Treasury supply
on short-term spreads have magnitudes fairly similar to that of the effect
on long-term spreads. Consistent with the results for long-term spreads,
the higher coefficient in panel D than in panel C is also indicative that
the high-grade commercial paper in panel C (like the Aaa-rated long-
term bonds in panel A) has some convenience attributes.
It is important to note that our evidence on the spread between
commercial paper and Treasury bills is less likely to be affected by issues
of omitted expected default or default risk premium controls than the
evidence on the Aaa-Treasury spread. This is the case because historical
default rates on the highest-rated commercial paper (A1/P1) are very
low, with literally zero defaults during the period 1972–2000 for which
Moody’s Investors Service (2000) provides data on commercial paper
8 When analyzing lower-grade commercial paper yields, we drop 2008. This year is a
dramatic outlier in terms of the lower-grade commercial paper yield, likely because of
increased default risk. Since our EDF default control, which pertains to corporate bonds,
may not be as good a control for default risk for commercial paper as for corporate bonds,
we drop 2008 in our analysis of lower-grade commercial paper.
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defaults. This latter observation can also explain why the default controls
are statistically not different from zero in the commercial paper re-
gressions in columns 7 and 9. Over a 3-month period, a highly rated
firm may run into financial difficulties and be downgraded but is un-
likely to enter bankruptcy.
B. Evidence for the Existence of Priced Liquidity and Safety Attributes
We next test predictions 3–5 that the convenience yield on Treasuries
is a reflection of two priced attributes: liquidity and safety. We consider
pairs of assets with different liquidity but similar safety or with different
safety but similar liquidity. Table 2 presents the results.
Columns 1 and 2 of table 2 present evidence for the existence of a
unique demand for long-term safe assets leading to a positive conve-
nience price of the long-term safety attribute. The dependent variable
is the spread between Baa and Aaa corporate bonds. Baa bonds carry
more default risk than Aaa bonds but are similarly illiquid. Chen, Les-
mond, and Wei (2007) study corporate bond liquidity in a large sample
of corporate bonds over the period 1995–2003 and report that the
spread between bid and ask prices (as a percentage of the price) on
Aaa corporate bonds averaged 52 basis points whereas it averaged 59
basis points on the Baa corporate bonds. These spreads compare to
about 10–20 basis points for Treasury bonds (calculated on the basis of
typical dollar spreads of two to three 32nds per $100 face value according
to Longstaff [2004]). Thus any convenience yield as measured in the
Baa-Aaa spread can reflect only the price of the long-term safety attribute
as opposed to a liquidity effect. Column 1 shows that an increase in
Treasury supply leads to a decrease in the Baa-Aaa spread, confirming
the existence of a priced long-term safety attribute driven by Treasury
supply. Theory suggests that the supply of long-term safe assets rather
than the total supply of Treasuries should drive the price of long-term
safety. In column 2, we present results using the supply of long-term
Treasury debt, measured as the supply of Treasuries with greater than
10 years’ remaining maturity divided by GDP. Since the maturity struc-
ture of government debt is likely to be endogenous, we instrument the
long-term supply by powers of debt/GDP. The first stage of the IV re-
gression is not reported for brevity but shows a highly significant relation
between total debt and the measure of long-term debt. The coefficient
of 0.304 means that a one-standard-deviation decrease in the supply
of long-term Treasuries (as a ratio to GDP) from its mean value of 0.079
to 0.021 raises the price of long-term safety by 40 basis points.
Columns 3 and 4 present evidence for the existence of a priced short-
term safety attribute driven by Treasury supply. The dependent variable
is the spread between 3-month A2/P2-rated and A1/P1-rated commer-
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TABLE 2
Impact of Treasury Supply on the Price of Safety and the Price of Liquidity
A. Price of Safety B. Price of Liquidity
Baa-AaaS P2-P1S FDIC-insuredCDs–BillsS Time/SavingsAccounts–BillsS
1926–
2008
(1)
1926–
2008
(2)
1974–
2007
(3)
1974–
2007
(4)
1984–2008
(5)
1935–65
(6)
Log(debt/
GDP)
.510
[3.45]
.888
[4.34]
1.884
[1.71]
.690
[2.57]
Log(debt 1 10-
year matur-
ity/GDP)*
.304
[2.44]
Log(debt ≤ 1-
year matur-
ity/GDP)*
1.462
[2.84]
Volatility 5.031
[6.47]
6.232
[6.65]
EDF .074
[.35]
.019
[.07]
Slope .232
[4.20]
.211
[3.29]
.014
[.42]
.055
[1.13]
.101
[.88]
1.181
[10.04]
Constant .660
[4.54]
.264
[.74]
.508
[2.39]
2.679
[2.47]
1.486
[1.52]
.170
[.95]
Observations 83 83 34 34 25 31
2R .600 .497 .233 .898
Estimation
method OLS IV OLS IV OLS OLS
Error term AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1) AR(1)
Note.—The dependent variables are the spread between Baa-rated corporate bonds
and Aaa-rated bonds (cols. 1 and 2), the spread between A2/P2-rated and A1/P1-rated
commercial paper (cols. 3 and 4), the spread between the interest rate on FDIC-insured
6-month CDs and 6-month Treasury bills (col. 5), and the spread between the average
interest rate paid by banks on time and savings deposits and 6-month Treasury bills (col.
6). Independent variables are the log of the ratio of the market value of Treasury debt
outstanding to US GDP, the log of the ratio of the market value of Treasury debt with
remaining maturity greater than 10 years to US GDP, the log of the ratio of the market
value of Treasury debt with remaining maturity less than 1 year to US GDP, the annualized
standard deviation of weekly log stock returns on the S&P 500 index (volatility), the
expected default frequency for corporate bonds (EDF), and the slope of the Treasury
yield curve measured as the spread between the 10-year Treasury yield and the 3-month
Treasury yield in cols. 1–4 and as the spread between the 10-year Treasury yield and the
6-month Treasury yield in cols. 5 and 6. Appendix B provides the precise definitions of
all variables. EDF, volatility, and slope controls are demeaned. Regressions are estimated
by OLS or instrumental variables (two-stage least squares), where we use instruments debt/
GDP, (debt/GDP)2, and (debt/GDP)3, as indicated. The standard errors are adjusted
assuming that errors are AR(1). We use the Box-Jenkins methodology for identifying the
error structure. t-statistics are in brackets.
* Instrumented by (debt/GDP), (debt/GDP)2, and (debt/GDP)3.
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cial paper. Over a 3-month period, on the basis of data from 1972 to
2000, Moody’s Investors Service (2000) estimates that the default prob-
ability on A2/P2 paper is 0.02 percent and is 0 percent for A1/P1 paper.
Thus there is a (small) difference in the safety of these short-term assets.
As for liquidity, there is little secondary market trading activity in com-
mercial paper of any rating. On the basis of data from 1998 to 2003,
Covitz and Downing (2007) report that most of the commercial paper
activity is in terms of new issuance. Secondary market transactions ac-
count for only about 8 percent of daily market trading activity by face
value. Using trading volume as a proxy for liquidity and EDF, and credit
rating and stock volatility as proxies for credit risk, Covitz and Downing
find that, in the cross section of commercial paper, liquidity differences
explain very little of the variation in rates. Thus, any convenience yield
as measured in the P2-P1 spread reflects the price of the short-term
safety attribute. In column 3 we use total Treasury supply, and column
4 presents an IV regression, where the supply measure is of Treasuries
with maturity less than 1 year divided by GDP. The results in both
columns 3 and 4 confirm the existence of a significant price of short-
term safety. The coefficient of 1.462 in column 4 means that a one-
standard-deviation decrease in the supply of short-term Treasuries (as
a ratio to GDP) from its mean value of 0.124 to 0.104 raises the price
of short-term safety by 26 basis points.
Columns 5 and 6 present evidence for the existence of a priced li-
quidity attribute of Treasuries, comparing assets with similar safety but
different liquidity. The dependent variable in column 5 is the spread
between the interest rate customers receive on 6-month FDIC-insured
certificates of deposit (CDs) and 6-month Treasury bills. We start the
CD series in 1984, corresponding to the phasing out of Regulation Q
(see Gilbert 1986). Given FDIC insurance, any convenience yield doc-
umented via Treasury supply affecting this spread can reflect only a
liquidity attribute. The supply variable in the regression is the total
supply of Treasuries since all Treasuries carry the liquidity attribute. The
impact of Treasury supply on the CD-Treasury spread confirms the ex-
istence of a significant price of liquidity over the 1984–2008 period. To
obtain evidence going back further, column 6 uses data on the spread
between the average interest rate paid on time and savings deposits and
Treasury bill rates. Since interest rate ceilings set by Regulation Q were
binding at various points during the period from 1966 until their phase-
out in the mid-1980s (see again Gilbert 1986), we focus on data from
1934—the first year of FDIC insurance—to 1965 (we do not have CD
rate data from this earlier period). The interest rate on time and savings
deposits is less ideal than the CD rate because FDIC insurance does not
apply to large deposits, so the interest rate on time and savings deposits
reflects a mix of insured accounts and noninsured accounts. The FDIC
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reports that insurance applied to approximately half of all deposits at
commercial banks over the period 1934–65 (FDIC 1984). As a result,
there is a slight difference in the safety of the average time and savings
deposit and of Treasuries.9 In addition, the time and savings deposits
are an amalgam of deposits with different maturities, making it more
difficult to maturity match the series to Treasuries. We match it to 6-
month Treasuries and include a slope control to deal with the maturity
mismatch. Subject to these qualifiers, the evidence in column 6 of an
impact of Treasury supply on the interest rate spread between time and
savings deposits and Treasuries provides further support that investors
value liquidity with Treasury supply driving the price of liquidity.10
We can gauge the magnitude of the liquidity effect in two different
ways. First, note that the deposits in column 6 include very short-term
savings accounts that are quite liquid. That is, the spread in column 6
reflects the difference between a very liquid Treasury and a liquid bank
account, so that the spread reflects an underestimate of how much
Treasury yields are reduced by the liquidity attribute of Treasuries. The
spread in column 5 is a more pure read on the liquidity impact on
Treasury yields, although the sample is quite short. The coefficient of
1.884 means that a one-standard-deviation decrease in the supply of
Treasuries (as a ratio to GDP) from its mean value of 0.439 to 0.243
raises the price of liquidity by 111 basis points. A second estimate of
the impact of Treasury supply on the price of liquidity comes from the
regression in table 1, column 7, which is the high-grade CP spread
regression for 1969–2008. Considering the spread between CP and Trea-
sury bills also deals with concerns that the spread between insured CD
rates and Treasury bills partly reflects intermediation costs or retail de-
posit effects. We have noted that data from 1972 on indicate that there
has never been a default on high-grade CP. The coefficient on the
default controls in that regression is also small and statistically not dif-
ferent from zero. Using this spread as a measure of liquidity, we find
that a one-standard-deviation decrease in the supply of Treasuries (as a
ratio to GDP) from its mean value of 0.439 to 0.243 raises the price of
liquidity by 57 basis points.
C. Quantifying the Convenience Yield
We next turn to quantifying the level of the convenience yield. Results
from the log specification pin down the derivative of the convenience
9 Including the fraction of deposits that are insured as a control does not affect the
results, and this variable is not a significant determinant of the spread.
10 Note that we focus on time and savings account deposit rates. Checking deposits,
and not time and savings deposits, are conventionally thought to provide a medium of
exchange attribute.
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TABLE 3
Impact of Treasury Supply on Bond Spreads: Piecewise-Linear Specification
A. Aaa-Treasury B. Baa-Treasury
1919–2008
(1)
1926–2008
(2)
1919–2008
(3)
1926–2008
(4)
b0 .319
[1.80]
.347
[2.55]
1.019
[1.94]
1.200
[7.68]
b1 2.590
[4.06]
3.075
[5.17]
4.309
[2.64]
4.952
[6.76]
b2 .584
[7.02]
.548
[9.74]
.626
[4.22]
.546
[12.92]
Volatility 1.206
[1.93]
6.215
[6.98]
Slope .096
[2.43]
.334
[5.07]
2R .479 .618 .290 .704
Observations 90 83 90 83
Note.—This table estimates a piecewise-linear specification for the relation between
Treasury supply and bond spreads. The function estimated is b  b # max [b 0 1 2
. The dependent variables are long-term yield spreads between corporatedebt/GDP, 0]
and Treasury bonds, measured in percentage units. Independent variables are the ratio
of the market value of Treasury debt outstanding to US GDP and controls for the default
risk and default risk premium on corporate bonds. Volatility is the annualized standard
deviation of weekly log stock returns on the S&P 500 index. Slope is the slope of the
Treasury yield curve measured as the spread between the 10-year Treasury yield and the
3-month Treasury yield. Appendix B provides the precise definitions of all variables. Vol-
atility and slope are demeaned. Regressions are estimated by nonlinear least squares. The
standard errors are adjusted assuming that errors are AR(1). We use the Box-Jenkins
methodology for identifying the error structure. t-statistics are in brackets.
yield with respect to Treasury supply but do not pin down the level of
the convenience yield as a function of Treasury supply. Theory suggests
that the value of convenience should go to zero given sufficient con-
venience assets. Imposing this asymptote property allows us to quantify
the level of the convenience yield, since the convenience yield at some
given an estimated relation between spreads and Treasury supply ofTvt
is simply (i.e., the distance between theT Tf(v /GDP) f(v /GDP) f()t t
predicted spread and the estimated asymptote).
The log function does not have the asymptote property. Table 3 re-
ports results in which we model the convenience yield with a function
that is piecewise linear in Treasury supply, .b max [b  debt/GDP, 0]1 2
Visually, the piecewise linear function appears to be a good fit of the
relation as depicted in figure 1. Indeed, the ’s for the piecewise linear2R
function rise a bit relative to the log function. Regressions are estimated
by nonlinear least squares. As in table 1, the standard errors are adjusted
assuming that the error term is AR(1).
The term is the convenience yield on long-b max [b  debt/GDP, 0]1 2
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term Treasury debt as a function of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Consider the
estimates from column 4 for the Baa-Treasury spread. We can evaluate
the convenience yield function at historical values of the debt-to-GDP
ratio from 1926 to 2008 and average these numbers to come up with
the average value of the convenience yield over our sample. This com-
putation gives 73 basis points.11 The Baa-Treasury spread reflects both
long-term safety and liquidity. We have argued that the Baa-Aaa spread
is driven only by long-term safety, whereas the Aaa-Treasury spread is
primarily driven by liquidity given the low default rate on Aaa bonds.
To provide a sense of the relative magnitudes of the safety and liquidity
convenience components, we make the simplifying assumption that the
Aaa-Treasury spread reflects only liquidity whereas the Baa-Aaa spread
reflects only safety. On the basis of the Aaa-Treasury estimates of column
2, the average liquidity convenience is 46 basis points. This number
should be interpreted as an upper bound for liquidity convenience since
the Aaa-Treasury spread does contain some safety convenience as well
(since Aaa bonds are not quite as safe as Treasuries). Further, subtracting
46 from 73 gives us that safety convenience is worth 27 basis points on
average (a lower bound since Aaa’s do carry some default risk).
Are these estimates plausible on the basis of the existing literature?
Consider liquidity first. Figure 1 in Krishnamurthy (2002) documents
that the yield spread between the on-the-run liquid 30-year Treasury
bond and the off-the-run less liquid 30-year Treasury bond was 12 basis
points on February 9, 2001. In price terms, if the modified duration of
the bonds is taken to be 12 years, the on-the-run bond was priced at
11 There is an important caveat in interpreting the piecewise-linear estimates. The es-
timates of (the intercept) and (the kink point) are heavily affected by observationsb b0 2
in the right tail of fig. 1 (i.e., high debt-to-GDP ratios). These high ratios occur only during
the 1940s and 1950s, so the parameter estimates are influenced by the idiosyncrasies of
the war period. In an effort to help finance the war debt at low interest rates, the Federal
Reserve committed to purchasing long-term Treasury bonds at a floor below prevailing
market prices, thereby inducing long-term Treasury rates to be lower than market forces
would have otherwise dictated. As events played out, the Federal Reserve did not in fact
accumulate many long-term Treasuries, but even so, the commitment to a floor should
be expected to affect prices. As a result, our estimates of are biased upward—implyingb0
that our above estimate of an average Treasury convenience yield of 73 basis points is
conservative—and estimates of are biased downward. The Federal Reserve intervenedb2
much more strongly in the Treasury bill market. Policy at the time effectively allowed
commercial banks to carry Treasury bills as interest-bearing reserves because the Federal
Reserve allowed banks to freely exchange Treasury bills for reserves at a fixed price. In
addition, beginning in 1943, the Federal Reserve directly purchased a large share of newly
issued Treasury bills, whereas long-term bonds were held by a variety of investors. The
Federal Reserve directly held 72 percent of total Treasury bills outstanding in 1944. See
Wicker (1969) for further details on all of these points. We present piecewise-linear re-
gressions for the long-term spreads, subject to the caveat noted above, but we do not
present results for the short-term spreads on grounds that they are likely largely unin-
formative about convenience yields. We also note, as can be seen from cols. 2, 4, 7, and
9 in table 1, that our main results about the impact of Treasury supply on yields hold for
subsamples that do not include the war period.
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1.44 percent over the off-the-run bond. Krishnamurthy notes that this
difference will converge to a price premium of 0.36 percentage points
over the next 9 months. Thus, the annualized liquidity convenience
yield on the on-the-run bond was 144 basis points (p[1.44 0.36] #
).12 This computation demonstrates that liquidity premia[12/9] # 100
on Treasury bonds are indeed quite large. Our estimate, which is roughly
one-third of that from the on-the-run bond, likely arises from the fact
that we measure a liquidity premium on all Treasuries and not only the
exceptionally liquid on-the-run bond.
Consider long-term safety next. Longstaff et al. (2005) study the pric-
ing of corporate bonds relative to Treasury bonds, using information
from the credit default swap market to pin down the default compo-
nent.13 As with most papers in the literature, their paper finds that there
is a substantial nondefault component in the corporate bond spreads.
Their estimates put the average nondefault component at 65 basis
points, which is in line with our overall convenience yield estimates.
Most relevant for the safety premium, they find that the nondefault
component is about 50 basis points for Aaa- and Aa-rated bonds and
about 70 basis points for lower-rated bonds. Thus the premium due to
safety for the Aaa bond is 20 basis points, which is similar to our estimate
of 27 basis points.
IV. Conclusion
Investors value the liquidity and safety attributes of Treasuries. We doc-
ument this by showing that changes in Treasury supply have large effects
on a variety of yield spreads. Evaluated on the basis of the Baa-Treasury
spread (for long-term bonds), a one-standard-deviation reduction in
Treasury supply (starting from mean supply) lowers Treasury yields by
77 basis points relative to corporate bond yields. The effects based on
the CPP2-bills spread (for short-term bonds) have roughly similar
magnitudes.
By studying pairs of assets with similar liquidity but different safety
(higher- and lower-grade corporate bonds and commercial paper) or
12 It is a coincidence that the 1.44 percent price premium and the 144 basis point
convenience yield are the same numbers in the example. For the sample studied in
Krishnamurthy (2002) for 1990–99, the paper finds that the on-the-run/off-the-run yield
spread converges at the rate of 3.2 basis points per 90 days (table 6, col. 1), which translates
to an annualized liquidity convenience yield of 156 basis points (p12 # 3.2 #
).[365/90]
13 In the piecewise-linear regressions, the constant term is the average default com-b0
ponent of the spread, since the EDF, volatility, and slope controls in the regressions are
demeaned. Consider col. 4 for the Baa-Treasury spread. This regression indicates that
is 1.200, which is within the range of estimates from the corporate bond price literatureb0
of the default component of Baa bonds (see Longstaff et al. 2005).
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with similar safety but different liquidity (FDIC-insured CDs and Trea-
sury bills), we document that changes in Treasury supply drive both the
equilibrium price of safety and the equilibrium price of liquidity. This
implies that Treasuries carry both a safety and a liquidity attribute. Using
a piecewise-linear specification, we estimate that the average conve-
nience yield on long-term Treasuries over the period 1926–2008 is 73
basis points, of which at most 46 basis points are driven by the liquidity
of Treasuries and at least 27 basis points by the safety of Treasuries.
One way of putting these basis point estimates in perspective is to
compute the seigniorage the government collects from being able to
finance the US federal debt with securities that offer convenience ben-
efits. The historical average debt-to-GDP ratio is 0.439. At this debt-to-
GDP, the convenience yield from the Baa-Treasury piecewise linear spec-
ification in column 4 of table 3 evaluates to 53 basis points. Multiplying
these numbers together gives seigniorage of 0.23 percent of GDP. Al-
ternatively, if we evaluate the convenience yield at each of the debt-to-
GDP ratios in our sample, multiplying by that debt-to-GDP ratio and
then averaging, we find that average seigniorage is also 0.23 percent of
GDP.14 For comparison, consider the seigniorage that the government
derives from households’ willingness to hold fiat money at no interest.
The monetary base at the end of 2007, prior to the Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing experiment, was $825 billion, corresponding to 6
percent of GDP. Suppose that the federal government had to repurchase
the monetary base by issuing Treasury bills and that these Treasury bills
had a 4 percent nominal yield. Then the annual interest expense of
this additional debt would be percent of GDP per year.4 # 0.06 p 0.24
Together, these calculations suggest that the total benefit from the con-
venience yield on Treasuries is large and that the seigniorage to the
government from being able to finance the current level of debt with
securities that have a convenience yield has the same order of magnitude
as the seigniorage resulting from the public’s willingness to hold fiat
money at no interest.
Our results have many implications for asset pricing. Since Treasury
debt carries a convenience yield, the common practice of identifying
the Treasury interest rate with models’ riskless interest rate is incorrect.
We have argued that the observed price of a one-period Treasury is
(implying an interest rate ofT ′ A TP p E [M ]/[1 v (v /GDP; y)] i ≈t t t1 t t t t
). The Treasury interest rate is lower than the “true”′ ln E [M ] v (7)t t1
riskless interest rate. In order to recover the true riskless rate from the
14 These computations implicitly assume that the convenience yield for short Treasuries
is similar to that for long Treasuries. Owing to the wartime interventions noted above, we
cannot estimate the level of the convenience yield for short Treasuries using the kinked
specification. However, we found quite similar sensitivity of long and short spreads to
changes in debt/GDP in table 1, suggesting that this may be a reasonable assumption.
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data (the rate that can meaningfully be compared to the riskless rate
from a model that ignores the convenience benefits of Treasuries), one
has to estimate the convenience yield and adjust Treasury rates by this
convenience yield. Our estimated demand curves may be used to mea-
sure the convenience yield and make the adjustment. The literature has
found that the high spread between corporate bond rates and Treasury
rates, and the high equity premium, measured as the average excess
stock market return over Treasury bill rates, are hard to reconcile on
the basis of standard factors. Accounting for a true riskless rate that is
higher than the Treasury rate can go part of the way toward reconciling
these findings.
Appendix A
Derivation for Prediction 2
We rewrite (9), using the approximation that , so that the return′′ v (7)1 v (7) ≈ e
from t to on holding Treasury bonds satisfiest 1
′ Av (v /GDP ;y ) T Tt t t1 p e E [M P /P ]t t1 t1 t (A1)
T T ′ A(t1)i ti v (v /GDP ;y )t1,t1 t,t t t tp E [M e ].t t1
Likewise, for corporate bonds, rewriting (16), we find
C Cl D C C (t1)i ti l Dt t t1,t1 t,t t t1 p e E [M P /P ] p E [M e ]. (A2)t t1 t1 t t t1
The excess return on corporate bonds over Treasury bonds is
C TP Pt1 t1R p  ≈(t 1)S  tS .t1 t1,t1 t,tC TP Pt t
We log-linearize to make the approximation. We make the following compu-
tations to arrive at an expression for the spread . We assume that isS Mt,t t1
lognormally distributed (where ) and that all interest rates are normallym { lnM
distributed. Then, it is straightforward to rewrite (A1) as
1′ A T1 p exp {v (v /GDP; y) E [m ] Var (m ) (t 1)E [i ]t t t t t1 t t1 t t1,t12
1T 2 T T T ti  (t 1) Var (i )Cov [m , (t 1)i  ti ]}t,t t t1,t1 t t1 t1,t1 t,t2
and rewrite (A2) as
1 C1 p exp {l D  E[m ] Var (m ) (t 1)E [i ]t t t1 t1 t t1,t12
1C 2 C C C ti  (t 1) Var (i )Cov [m , (t 1)i  ti ]}.t,t t t1,t1 t1 t1,t1 t,t2
We take logs and subtract these last two equations. We assume that the terms
involving and are approximately the same. That is,T CVar (i ) Var (i )t t1,t1 t t1,t1
innovations in both corporate and Treasury rates have the same variance. Then
This content downloaded  on Tue, 1 Jan 2013 11:09:48 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
262 journal of political economy
1 t 1′ A0 p [v (v /GDP; y) l D ] E [S ]t t t t t t t1,t1
t t
1
 S  Cov [m , (t 1)S  tS ],t,t t t1 t1,t1 t,t
t
or
1 t 1 1′ AS p [v (v /GDP; y) l D ] E [S ] Cov (m , R ).t,t t t t t t t t1,t1 t t1 t1
t t t
Solving this equation recursively for , we find the expression in the text.St,t
Appendix B
Data
For all yield spreads analyzed in table 1, table 2, panel A, and table 3, we use
annual observations, sampled in July of the year up to (and including) 1976
and in October of each year after that.
Table 1
Aaa-Treasury yield spread: The percentage spread between Moody’s Aaa-rated
long-maturity corporate bond yield and the yield on long-maturity Treasury
bonds. The Moody’s Aaa index is constructed from a sample of long-maturity
(≥ 20 years) industrial and utility bonds (industrial only from 2002 onward),
available from 1919 to 2008. The yield on long-maturity Treasury bonds is the
average yield on long-term government bonds, available from 1919 to 1999. The
Treasury bonds included are due or callable after 8 years for 1919–25, 12 years
for 1926–41, 15 years for 1941–51, 12 years for 1952, and 10 years for 1953–99.
We use the yield on 20-year maturity Treasury bonds for 2000–2008. All three
data series are from the Federal Reserve’s FRED database (series AAA,
LTGOVTBD, and GS20), with the exception that the long-term Treasury yield
data for 1919–24 are from Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914–41, table 128.
Baa-Treasury yield spread: The percentage spread between Moody’s Baa-rated
long-maturity corporate bond yield and the yield on long-maturity Treasury
bonds. The Moody’s Baa index is constructed from a sample of long-maturity
(≥ 20 years) industrial and utility bonds (industrial only from 2002 onward),
available from 1919 to 2008. The Baa data series is also from the FRED database
(series BAA).
CP-bills yield spread: The percentage yield spread between high-grade com-
mercial paper and Treasury bills. For 1971–2008 the commercial paper yield is
from the FRED database. For 1971–96 it is the series CP3M (the average of
offering rates on 3-month commercial paper placed by several leading dealers
for firms whose bond rating is AA or equivalent), and for 1997–2008 the series
CPN3M (the 3-month AA nonfinancial commercial paper rate). Prior to 1971
we use the commercial paper series for prime commercial paper, 4–6-month
maturity, from Banking and Monetary Statistics (table 12.5 for 1941–70 and table
120 for 1920–40). The Treasury bill yield is for 3-month Treasury bills for 1971–
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2008 (from FRED, series TB3MS), 6-month Treasury bills for 1959–70 (from
FRED, series TB6MS), and 3–6 month Treasury bills for 1920–58 from the NBER
Macro History database (series m13029b for 1931–58 and series m13029a for
1920–30).
CPP2-bills yield spread: The percentage yield spread between lower-grade com-
mercial paper and Treasury bills. Calculated as the sum of the CP-bills yield
spread described above (i.e., high-grade commercial paper minus Treasury bills)
and the yield spread between 30-day A2/P2 nonfinancial commercial paper and
30-day AA nonfinancial commercial paper, with data obtained from the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.15 For 1996 and 1997 we do not have data from the
Federal Reserve and use data from Bloomberg (Bloomberg currently does not
have data for these two years, and our data are based on an earlier download
from Bloomberg).
Debt/GDP: The supply of Treasuries scaled by GDP, at market value. Calculated
as (debt/GDP with debt at face value) # (total market value of Treasuries/total
face value of Treasuries).
The debt/GDP series (with debt at face value) is from Henning Bohn’s web
page for years 1919–2008. The debt measure includes debt held by the Federal
Reserve but excludes debt held by other parts of the government such as the
Social Security Trust Fund. Debt is for the end of the government’s fiscal year,
that is, the end of June up to and including 1976 and the end of September
from 1977 on. GDP is for the same fiscal year.
The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Monthly US Treasury
Database is used to calculate the factor for translating face values to market
values (total market value of Treasuries/total face value of Treasuries). This
database starts in December 1925. Prior to 1949 the amounts outstanding are
missing for a lot of the Treasuries. From 1949 onward, at least 96 percent of
Treasuries in the database have values for amounts outstanding. We multiply
Bohn’s debt/GDP series by the CRSP ratio of Treasury market to face value to
get a series for the market value of Treasury debt/GDP. Over the period 1949–
2008, the correlation between debt/GDP at face value and debt/GDP at market
value is .996, and the means and standard deviations of the two series are very
similar. Prior to 1949, one can still calculate the ratio of Treasury market to face
value for the set bonds in the CRSP database for which the data are available.
This set is somewhat skewed toward better coverage of long maturities. We get
similar results whether we use debt/GDP at face value and debt/GDP at market
value in the pre-1949 period. We report the results that use the market debt/
GDP series.
Prior to 1926 the CRSP database is not available, and we therefore do not
make the market value adjustment. In general, over the 1926–2008 period our
results throughout the paper are very similar whether the market value adjust-
ment is made or not.
Volatility: Annualized standard deviation of weekly log stock returns on the
S&P 500 index. We calculate weekly returns on the value-weighted S&P index
on the basis of daily returns obtained from CRSP. As the volatility measure for
a given year, we compute the standard deviation of the weekly log returns over
15 We thank Kenneth Kuttner and Michael Fleming for help in obtaining these data.
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the year leading up to the end of the government’s fiscal year. We annualize
the standard deviation of weekly log returns by multiplying by the square root
of 52.
EDF: Expected default frequency for nonfinancial corporate bonds. The data
are obtained from Moody’s Analytics. We use the median EDF credit measure
reported by Moody’s Analytics for large nonfinancial firms (defined as firms
with a book value of assets 1 $300 million in inflation-adjusted dollars). The
EDF credit measure is available from 1969 to 2008. We use annual observations,
sampled in July of the year up to (and including) 1976 and in October of each
year after that.
Slope: Slope of the Treasury yield curve measured as the spread between the
10-year Treasury yield and the 3-month Treasury yield. The interest rate on
Treasuries with 10-year maturity is from FRED for 1953–2008 (series GS10).
Prior to 1953 we use series m13033a (1926–41) and m13033b (1942–52) from
the NBER Macro History Database, with both these series referring to the yield
on long-term Treasuries. The interest rate on Treasuries with 3-month maturity
is from FRED for 1934–2008 (series TB3MS) and from the NBER Macro History
database prior to that (series m13029a for 1926–33, referring to 3–6-month
Treasuries). We use annual observations, sampled in July of the year up to (and
including) 1976 and in October of each year after that.
In all tables, volatility, EDF and slope variables are demeaned.
Table 2, Panel A
Baa-Aaa yield spread: The percentage yield spread between Moody’s Baa-rated
long-maturity bond yield and Moody’s Aaa-rated long-maturity bond yield. Both
series are described under table 1 above.
A2/P2-A1/P1 yield spread: The yield spread between 30-day A2/P2 nonfinancial
commercial paper and 30-day AA nonfinancial commercial paper, with data
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Bloomberg (as de-
scribed under table 1).
(Debt 1 10 year maturity)/GDP: The ratio of Treasury debt with more than 10
years’ remaining maturity to GDP. For 1949–2008 the amount of Treasury debt
is at market value and is calculated using the CRSP Monthly US Treasury Da-
tabase. For 1926–48 the amount of Treasury debt is at face value and is obtained
from Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914–41, table 147, and Banking and
Monetary Statistics 1941–70 (table 13.5A minus table 13.5B).
(Debt ≤ 1 year maturity)/GDP: The ratio of Treasury debt with a year or less of
remaining maturity to GDP. For 1949–2008 the amount of Treasury debt is at
market value and is calculated using the CRSP Monthly US Treasury Database
(we use this series only in col. 2, which is based on data from 1974 onward).
For the above two variables, the data for GDP used are from Henning Bohn’s
web page.
Debt/GDP, volatility, slope: As for table 1.
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Table 2, Panel B
(FDIC-insured CDs)–bills yield spread: The percentage yield spread between the
yield on 6-month certificates of deposit and Treasury bills. The CD yields are
the national average rates obtainable by depositors on small-denomination (and
thus FDIC-insured) CDs of 6-month maturity, where small denomination means
the account opening minimum. The rates are from Bank Rate Monitor and are
obtained from the New York Times for 1984–97 and from Bloomberg for 1998–
2008 (ticker ILSFNAVG) and are as of the end of September. The Treasury bill
yield used is the yield on 6-month bills obtained from FRED (series TB6MS),
as of September.
(Time and savings accounts)–bills yield spread: The percentage yield spread be-
tween time and savings accounts and Treasury bills. We estimate the yield on
time and savings accounts using data from FDIC Historical Statistics on Banking,
tables CB06 and CB15. Specifically, we divide the total annual interest on deposits
in domestic offices by the sum of savings and time deposits in domestic offices
(using averages of beginning- and end-of-year values for the deposits). The FDIC
series is available from 1935 onward. We compare this yield series to the yield
on 6-month Treasuries, with data obtained from FRED (series TB6MS) from
1959 on and from the NBER Macro History database prior to that (series
m13029b for 1935–58, referring to 3–6-month Treasuries). Since the yield on
time and savings accounts is an annual average, we use the annual calendar year
average of 6-month monthly Treasury bill rates for comparison.
Slope: Slope of the Treasury yield curve measured as the spread between the
10-year Treasury yield and the 6-month Treasury yield. The interest rate on
Treasuries with 10-year maturity is defined as in the slope variable used in table
1. The interest rate on Treasuries with 6-month maturity is from FRED for 1959–
2008 (series TB6MS) and from the NBER Macro History database prior to that
(series m13029b, referring to 3–6-month Treasuries). The slope variable in col-
umn 5 is based on September values to match the timing of the left-hand-side
variable. The slope variable in column 6 is (annual calendar year average of 10-
year monthly yields)  (annual calendar year average of 6-month monthly
yields), in order to match the timing of the dependent variable, which is a
calendar year average.
Debt/GDP: As for table 1.
Table 3: Same data as for table 1.
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